![]() For analyses of Aquinas’s theory of cognition in general and of intellection in particular, see Pasnau ( 1997), Panaccio ( 2001), Perler ( 2002, 31–105), as well as Michon ( 2007 2009). Recently, this theme has been thoroughly discussed by Pini ( 2015), whose theses I will present in the course of the argument. I will then tackle the complicated question as to how this difference of cognition is to be accounted for at the habitual level. In his later works, following Augustine, Aquinas holds that the operation of the intellect, besides the use of the species, entails the production of another means of cognition: the “word.” I will argue in favour of the view that the later Aquinas does not abandon the first type of intellectual operation, based only on the species, but maintains both operations in parallel, and that his reason for maintaining these two different operations is that the species and the word provide different kinds of cognition. Indeed, an additional step is required in order for intellection to be achieved, namely an “operation.” I will explain why this additional step is needed. This reactivation, for Aquinas, is not yet the act of intellection. ![]() I will then turn to the problem of the reactivation of the “stored” intelligible species, which constitutes the intellectual habit. ![]() I will start with a presentation of the acquisition of intellection and the constitution of intellectual habit. The aim of my paper is to study the relations between habit and the operation of intellection in Aquinas.
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